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Preventing and Responding to Atrocity Crimes:  
China, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect 
Mauro Barelli* 
Abstract 
 
With China on the rise, a question that is becoming increasingly important for 
international lawyers is that of the potential implications of Beijing’s strident 
defense of State sovereignty for the international legal system. Against this 
background, a better understanding of Chinese interpretations of sovereignty 
appears not only useful but also desirable. This article contributes to clarifying 
some of the intricacies of those interpretations by examining China’s approach to 
the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Through an analysis of both its 
conceptual and practical engagement with R2P, the article reveals that Beijing’s 
attitudes towards questions of sovereignty and non-intervention in the context of 
humanitarian crises are more complex and nuanced than often assumed. After 
exploring the conditions under which China would accept infringements of 
sovereignty aimed at protecting basic values of humanity, the article suggests that 
the real challenge that Beijing will face going forward is not to show more 
willingness to engage in forcible interventions, but, rather, make credible 
contributions to peacefully preventing and halting the commission of atrocity 
crimes. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
As an influential member of the international community, China faced heavy 
criticism for its handling of the Syrian crisis.1 According to many, by calling for a 
political and consensual solution to the conflict while resisting the imposition of 
strong measures against the Assad government, China failed in its responsibility as a 
permanent member of the Security Council to help solve the crisis and hold the 
perpetrators of heinous crimes accountable. 2  Among other things, this wave of 
                                                 
* Senior Lecturer, City, University of London. E-mail: Mauro.Barelli.1@city.ac.uk. I would like to thank 
Prof. Nicholas Tsagourias and Dr. Wim Muller for their comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
1 For a discussion of the Chinese position on the crisis, see, Yun Sun, China’s Approach to the Syrian 
Crisis: Beyond the United Nations, China Policy Institute: Analysis, 15 December 2014, and M. Swaine, 
Chinese Views of the Syrian Conflict, China Leadership Monitor, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 13 September 2012. For a broader discussion of the Security Council’s early response to the 
conflict, see J. Gifkins, The UN Security Council Divided: Syria in Crisis, (2012) 4 Global Responsibility to 
Protect, pp. 377-393. 
2 Security Council, sixty-sixth year, 6627th meeting, 4 October 2011, UN Doc. S/PV.6627; Security 
Council, sixty-seventh year, 6711th meeting, 4 February 2012, UN Doc. S/PV.6711; and Security Council, 
sixty-ninth year, 7180th meeting, 22 May 2014, UN Doc. S/PV.7180. See, also, “China/Russia Veto a 
Victory for 'Impunity, Inaction and Injustice'” Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, 4 October 
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criticism revealed the potential tension that exists between Beijing’s intransigent 
defence of State sovereignty and an international system that is increasingly less State-
centred in nature. 3  The significance and implications of this presumed 
incompatibility become all the more important in light of the fact that China is among 
the States who are benefitting from an ongoing process of re-distribution of power at 
the international level.4 Indeed, as a military and economic power with a permanent 
seat at the Security Council, China today has not only an appetite but also the capacity 
to influence the course of global affairs.5 As acknowledged also by Xue Hanqin, the 
current Chinese judge at the International Court of Justice, this situation has led to an 
‘understandable concern’ about the role that Beijing will play on the world stage, not 
only economically but also politically and legally. 6  Under these circumstances, a 
better understanding of the nature and dynamics of China’s defensive attitudes 
towards sovereignty appears not only useful but also desirable.  
Sovereignty is a complex and contested concept which has both political, 
jurisdictional, economic and territorial connotations. 7  Recognizing its 
                                                 
2011, at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/191-the-crisis-in-syria/3916-
global-center-for-the-responsibility-to-protect-chinarussia-veto-a-victory-for-impunity-inaction-and-
injustice- [accessed 25 January 2018]; and “UN: Russia, China Vetoes Betray Syrian People”, Human Rights 
Watch, 4 February 2012, at https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/04/un-russia-china-vetoes-betray-
syrian-people [accessed 25 January 2018]. 
3 For a discussion of various manifestations of this tension, see, W. Muller, China: An Illiberal, Non-
Western State in a Western-centric, Liberal Order?, (2016) 15 Baltic Yearbook of International Law, pp. 216–
237; E. Posner and J. Yoo, International Law and the Rise of China, (2006-2007) 7 Chicago Journal of 
International Law, pp. 6-15; J. Ku, China and the Future of International Adjudication, (2012) 27 Maryland 
Journal of International Law, pp. 154-173. For non-legal analyses, see G. Chin and R. Thakur, “Will China 
Change the Rules of Global Order?”, (2010) 33 The Washington Quarterly, pp. 119–38; and G. Ikenberry, 
The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs, 
January/February 2008. 
4
 W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law: Structural Realignment and Substantive 
Pluralism, (2015) 56 Harvard International Law Journal, pp. 1-80. 
5 ‘Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great 
Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’, Speech by President Xi Jinping at the 19th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 18 October 2017, at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm; 
and ‘The Essence of Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics’, Statement by Foreign Minister 
Wang Yi at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 19 October 2017,  at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1503756.shtml [accessed 25 January 2018]. 
6
 Xue Hanqin, Chinese Observations on International Law, (2007) 6 Chinese Journal of International Law, 
pp. 83–93. 
7
 See, among others, S. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press, 1999), L. 
Henkin, That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et cetera, (1999) 68 
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multidimensional character, Brierly described it as ‘an aggregate of particular and 
very extensive claims that States habitually make for themselves in their relations with 
other States.’8 Given the variety of meanings that may be attached to it, this article 
does not aim to discuss all the possible manifestations of China’s stance on 
sovereignty.9 Instead, its objective is to shed light on the latter through an analysis of 
Beijing's engagement with the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P 
promises to be a valuable case-study because it is predicated on the idea that 
sovereignty is no longer inviolable but, rather, contingent on a State’s willingness and 
ability to protect its populations from atrocity crimes. 10  Thus, when a State 
perpetrates or allows such crimes on its territory, the principle of non-intervention, 
which is both a ‘substantiation and manifestation’ of sovereignty, 11  yields to the 
responsibility of the international community to (intervene to) protect.12 To what 
extent, then, is China prepared to accept infringements of sovereignty that are 
ultimately aimed at protecting basic values of humanity? In answering this question, 
the article will highlight that Chinese attitudes towards sovereignty in the context of 
humanitarian crises are more complex and nuanced than often assumed. At a broader 
level, the article will also offer valuable insights into some of the dynamics affecting 
the rise of China to great power status, and especially the tension that exist between 
its ambition, and indeed, often, necessity, to take a more active role on the world stage 
and its traditionally restrained approach to foreign policy.  
                                                 
Fordham Law Review, pp. 1-14, and H. Schermers, Different Aspects of Sovereignty, in G. Kreijen (ed), 
State, Sovereignty and International Governance (OUP 2002). 
8
 J. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 4th ed (Clarendon Press, 1949) p. 48. 
9 For broader discussions, see W. Muller, China's Sovereignty in International Law: from Historical 
Grievance to Pragmatic Tool, (2013) 1 China-EU Law Journal, pp. 35-59, and A. Carlson, Moving Beyond 
Sovereignty? A Brief Consideration of Recent Changes in China's Approach to International Order and 
the Emergence of the Tianxia Concept, (2011) 68 Journal of Contemporary China, pp. 89– 102. 
10 On the concept of atrocity crimes, see, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention 
(United Nations, 2014). 
11
 R. Buchan, and N. Tsagourias, The Crisis in Crimea and the Principle of Non-Intervention, (2017) 19 
International Community Law Review, pp. 165-193, at p. 172. See also, P. Kunig, Prohibition of 
Intervention, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (April 2008), and R. Vincent, Non-
intervention and International Order (Princeton University Press 1974). 
12
 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Report 
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, International Development Research 
Centre, 2001, p. IX. 
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The article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of Chinese 
perspectives on the centrality of sovereignty in international law and relations. Section 
3 illustrates the reasons behind China’s strict approach to sovereignty, while also 
highlighting the factors that are pushing Beijing to soften its position on the principle. 
Following on that, Section 4 introduces the meaning and scope of R2P in international 
law. Section 5 goes on to examine China’s conceptual engagement with R2P’s three 
pillar-structure, while Section 6 turns to Beijing’s practical implementation of the 
principle. Lastly, Section 7 draws some final conclusions. 
 
 
2. Sovereignty in International Law and Relations: Chinese Perspectives    
There is little doubt that the concept of sovereignty, which is typically defined as a 
State’s capacity to exercise supreme authority within its territory and independence 
in relation to other States,13 is key to the international legal system.14 Article 2(1) of 
the Charter of the United Nations (UN) unambiguously affirms that ‘the Organisation 
is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of States’.15 No less importantly, 
the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, which represents ‘the 
corollary of every State’s right to sovereignty’, 16  forms part of customary 
international law.17 Following the same logic, a State’s territorial integrity receives 
                                                 
13 See, among others, R. Lansing, Notes on Sovereignty in a State, (1907) 1 The American Journal of 
International Law, pp. 297-320; and R. Vincent, supra note 11, p. 40.  
14  Case concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge 
(Malaysia/Singapore), International Court of Justice, Judgment of 23 May 2008, para. 122. See also, A. 
Cassese, States: Rise and Decline of the Primary Subjects of the International Community, in B. 
Fassbender and A. Peters (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (OUP 2014) p. 69; 
and B. Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations (Polity Press 2014) p. 139. 
15 Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
16 R. Jennings and A. Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, Volume 1 Peace (9th ed, Longman 1996) p. 
428. 
17 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States 
of America), International Court of Justice, Judgment of 27 June 1982, paras. 202-204. See also, Article 8 
of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States; General Assembly resolution 2131 
(XX) on the Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection 
of the Independence and Sovereignty; General Assembly resolution 36/103 on the Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal affairs of States; and General Assembly 
resolution 2625 (XXV) on Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.  
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international legal protection as a fundamental component of statehood.18 All that 
being said, it is undeniable that in the past few decades the scope of sovereignty has 
undergone an important transformation. In particular, the expanding reach of 
international law, combined with the rapid development of economic globalization, 
has limited States’ ability to freely exercise their sovereign powers in several 
important ways.19 For some, this erosion of sovereignty has called, or should call into 
question the validity of State-centric models of international relations.20 For others, 
States have simply used their sovereign powers to limit their powers, and, in doing 
so, have redefined sovereignty in light of new conditions and circumstances. 21 
According to this narrative, ‘sovereignty’ is not in decline; on the contrary, it is set to 
remain firmly at the centre of both world politics and international law.22   
Among the States that subscribe to the latter view is certainly China. In his 1989 
Hague Lecture, the late Wang Tieya emphasized that China regards the principle of 
sovereignty ‘as the cornerstone of the whole system of international law.’23 Almost 
three decades later, the primacy of sovereignty remains a distinguishing feature of 
Chinese international legal discourse.24 To be sure, this is not tantamount to saying 
                                                 
18
 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. See also, Article 1 of the 1974 Consensus Definition of Aggression adopted 
by General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX); and General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), supra 
note. 
19 For a discussion, see, C. Eric, Globalization and the Future of the Law of the Sovereign State, (2010) 
8 International Journal of Constitutional Law, pp. 636–655; A. Coleman and J. Magoto, "Westphalian" 
Meets "Eastphalian" Sovereignty: China in a Globalized World, (2013) 3 Asian Journal of International 
Law, pp. 237-269; and A. Pronto, ‘Human-Rightism’ and the Development of General International Law, 
(2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law, pp. 753-765, at p. 755. 
20 T. Jacobsen, C. Sampford, and R. Thakur, Re-Envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia? (Ashgate 
2008); A. Van Staden and H. Vollaard, The Erosion of State Sovereignty: Towards a Post-territorial 
World? in G. Kreijen (ed), supra note 7; R. Falk, Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia, 
(2002) 6 The Journal of Ethics, pp. 311-352; A. Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty, (2009) 3 
European Journal of International Law, pp. 513–544. 
21 Case of the S.S. Wimbledon, Judgment of 17 August 1923 (Series A, No. 1), First Annual Report of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, pp. 163-168.  See, also, R. Jennings, Sovereignty and 
International Law, in G. Kreijen (ed), supra note 7, p. 36.  
22
 S. Krasner, Think Again: Sovereignty, Foreign Policy, 20 November 2009; Zewei Yang, The End of State 
Sovereignty? – From a Chinese Perspective, in P. Sevastik (ed) Aspects of Sovereignty: Sino-Swedish 
Reflections (Martinus Nijhoff 2013) pp. 161-178; and J. Alvarez, The Schizophrenias of R2P, in P. Alston 
and E. Macdonald (ed) Human Rights, Intervention, and the Use of Force (OUP 2008). 
23 W Tieya, International law in China: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Volume 221) Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (Brill Nijhoff, 1990) 288. 
24 Xue Hanqin, Chinese Contemporary Perspectives on International Law: History, Culture and International 
Law, Pocketbooks of the Hague Academy of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) 
Chapter 2; W. Muller, supra note 9; P. Chan, China, Sovereignty and International Legal Order 
(Brill/Nijhoff 2015); S. Ogden, Sovereignty and International Law: the Perspective of the People’s 
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that Beijing clings to an absolute notion of sovereignty. 25 As recently acknowledged 
by President Xi Jinping, China engages daily with the challenges and opportunities 
posed by the contemporary globalized world, mindful that its own dependence on 
such world is constantly deepening. 26 In doing so, Beijing fully accepts that the 
combined forces of international markets, resources and rules can affect, and to some 
extent limit, its sovereign powers. 27  Indeed, China has accepted important 
restrictions of its own sovereignty as a result of global pressures and incentives. The 
most notable example is provided by its accession, in 2001, to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). At that time, in order to further integrate into, and benefit from, 
the world economy, China not only agreed to an ‘ambitious package of market 
opening commitments’,28 but also accepted the WTO’s system of compulsory dispute 
settlement notwithstanding its traditional reluctance to submit to international 
adjudication. 29  Also of relevance is the fact that, despite expressing strong 
reservations about the international human rights project,30 China has both ratified 
six of the nine core international human rights treaties and accepted the legitimacy of 
various international monitoring mechanisms which inevitably interfere with the way 
in which States treat their own citizens.31  
                                                 
Republic of China, (1974) 7 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, pp. 1-32; J. Pan, 
Sovereignty’s Implications for China: Then and Now, in P. Sevastik (ed), supra note 22; Li Zhaojie, 
Legacy of Modern Chinese History: its Relevance to the Chinese Perspective of the Contemporary 
International Legal Order, (2001) 5 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law, pp. 314-326. 
 25 Wang Tieya, supra note 23, p. 292; See, also, Xue Hanqin, supra note 24, p. 80. 
26
 Statement by President Xi Jinping at The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, 
Beijing, 29 November 2014, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1215680.shtml. See 
also, ‘Exploring the Path of Major-Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics’, Remarks by Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi at the Launch of the World Peace Forum, 27 June 2013, at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1053908.shtml 
[accessed 25 January 2018]. 
27
 Statement by President Xi Jinping, supra note. 
28
 ‘Overview of the Terms of China’s Accession to WTO’, European Commission, 1 October 2001, para. 56, 
at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/october/tradoc_111955.pdf [accessed 25 January 
2018]. 
29
 See, for example, H. Moynihan, China’s Evolving Approach to International Dispute Settlement (Chatham 
House, 2017). 
30 See, for example, Article 1 of the Beijing Declaration adopted by the First South-South Human Rights 
Forum on 8 December 2017, at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-12/08/c_136811775.htm 
[accessed 25 January 2018]. See, also, The Costs of International Advocacy: China’s Interference in United 
Nations Human Rights Mechanisms (Human Rights Watch, 2017). 
31
 See, among others, S. Sceats and S. Breslin, China and the International Human Rights System (Chatham 
House, 2012).  
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Yet, China’s recognition of the elastic nature of sovereignty is tempered by two 
fundamental caveats which ultimately define Chinese defensive attitudes towards the 
principle. First, China opposes restrictions to sovereignty that are non-reciprocal and 
non-voluntary; 32  and, second, it firmly opposes any attempt to conceptually 
undermine sovereignty as the building block of international law and relations.33  
In line with this defensive stance, Chinese policy statements regularly underline the 
importance of respecting the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention,34 
rhetorically portray sovereignty as ‘the most important feature of any independent 
State’, 35  and warn against infringements upon the territorial integrity of any 
country. 36  The same attitudes are reflected in official documents relating to 
international law. For example, a 2016 joint declaration with Russia on the Promotion 
of International Law expressly affirmed the centrality of the principles of sovereign 
equality and non-intervention for the stability of international relations.37 In the same 
fashion, China’s written statement to the International Court of Justice in the 2009 
Kosovo opinion strongly defended the inviolability of State sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.38 Inevitably, China’s stance on sovereignty also informs Beijing’s approach 
                                                 
32 Wang Zonglai and Hu Bin, China’s Reform and Opening-up and International Law, (2010) 9 Chinese 
Journal of International Law, pp. 193–203, at p. 197; and Wang Tieya, supra note 23, p. 295.  
33
 Xue Hanqin, supra note 24, p. 94; Wang Tieya, supra note 23, p. 296. 
34 See, for example, ‘Firmly March on the Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive to Complete 
the Building of a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects’, Speech by President Hu Jintao at the 18th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China (8 November 2012), at 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27137540.htm; and the 
Position Papers of the People's Republic of China at the 71st (8 August 2016) and 72nd (5 September 2017) 
Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, respectively at http://www.china-
un.org/eng/hyyfy/t1396325.htm, and 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/P020170904435053466190.pdf [accessed 25 
January 2018]. 
35  ‘Carry forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to Build a Better World Through Win-win 
Cooperation’, Address by President Xi Jinping at Meeting Marking the 60th Anniversary of the Initiation 
of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 28 June 2014, at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1170143.shtml [accessed 25 January 
2018]. 
36 Ibid; See, also, ‘Secure a Decisive Victory’, supra note 5. 
37
 The Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the Promotion of International 
Law, 25 June 2016, at http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2331698 [accessed 25 January 2018]. 
38
 Written Statement of the People's Republic of China to the International Court of Justice on the Issue 
of Kosovo, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion) 16 April 2009, at http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/141/15611.pdf [accessed 25 January 2018]. 
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to foreign policy. Since the mid-1950s the conduct of Chinese foreign affairs has been 
shaped by the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which affirm, in essence, that 
States should respect each other’s sovereignty and refrain from intervening in each 
other’s internal affairs in order to establish peaceful and stable relations. 39  The 
inclusion of the five principles in the Preamble to the Chinese Constitution is 
testament to their enduring institutional relevance.40 As Chinese authorities rarely 
miss an opportunity to highlight China’s allegiance to these principles,41 the latter 
show no sign of diminishing in importance.42 On the contrary, as will be further 
discussed below, they currently underpin Beijing’s endeavors to explore new forms 
of diplomacy. 43  
While all the above clearly highlights how the concept of sovereignty frames the 
Chinese visions of international law and relations, it is important to note that China’s 
real approach to questions of sovereignty is more pragmatic and flexible than its 
rhetoric seems to suggest.44 The reasons for and implications of this incongruence will 
be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
3. China and Sovereignty: Navigating Between Competing Impulses 
As explained by Wang Tieya, China’s defensive stance on sovereignty is, first and 
foremost, a direct consequence of the Chinese people’s ‘struggles for their [own] lost 
                                                 
39 The five principles are: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual 
non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; 
and peaceful coexistence. 
40  Constitution of the People’s Republic of China as amended on 14 March 2004, at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm [accessed 25 January 2018]. 
41  ‘Carry forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’, supra note 35; See, also, Statement by 
Ambassador Liu Jieyi at the Security Council Open Debate on Maintenance of International Peace and 
Security, 21 August 2014, at http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/t1186619.htm 
[accessed 25 January 2018]. 
42 Carry forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, supra note 35. 
43 Ibid.; Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind, Speech by President Xi Jinping 
at the United Nations Office at Geneva, 18 January 2017, at 
http://iq.chineseembassy.org/eng/zygx/t1432869.htm [accessed 25 January 2018]; and ‘Secure a 
Decisive Victory’, supra note 5. 
44 A. Carlson, On Being Sovereign During a Time of Increased Interdependence: China's Evolving 
Approach to Sovereignty and Its Implications for Chinese Foreign Relations, in S. Breslin (ed), Handbook 
of China’s International Relations (Routledge, 2010). 
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sovereignty.’45 To appreciate this point, one must refer to what in Chinese history is 
known as the century of humiliation. This historical period, which began in 1839 with 
the first Opium War and lasted over 100 years, saw China reduced to a semi-colonial 
status by a series of military aggressions at the hands of Western powers and Japan.  
A distinguishing feature of this period was the imposition of the so-called ‘unequal 
treaties’, in which China was forced to concede many of its territorial and sovereignty 
rights. Crucially, this era of discrimination and domination by outside powers 
strikingly contrasted with the glories of Imperial China and the Chinese civilization. 
According to official accounts, it was only with Mao Zedong’s proclamation of the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 that this sad chapter of Chinese 
history came to an end. Due to Cold War dynamics, however, communist China was 
excluded from the UN until October 1971, a circumstance which further added to 
Beijing’s growing sense of victimhood. 46 There is little doubt that the century of 
humiliation has been rhetorically used by governmental officials to serve a variety of 
purposes. This, however, does not change the fact that this experience of subjugation 
and humiliation, now deeply embedded in the nation’s collective psyche, has 
importantly contributed to define China’s distrust for interventionist foreign policies. 
 This aversion is further motivated by strategic reasons. In particular, by respecting 
the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in its relations to other States, 
China preserves its ability to use those same principles as legal tools to protect itself 
against foreign attempts to meddle in its internal affairs. For a country determined to 
resist the imposition of Western liberal models of society, and confronted with a 
number of security-related challenges that have both domestic and international 
dimensions, the importance of this extra-layer of (legal) protection can hardly be 
overstated. Thus, in the words of President Xi Jinping: 
                                                 
45 Wang Tieya, supra note 23, p. 290. See also Wang Yi, China: A Staunch Defender and Builder of the 
International Rule of Law, (2014) 13 Chinese Journal of International Law, pp. 635-638, at p. 635. 
46 China’s seat at the United Nations was initially controlled by the Republic of China, which at the 
time was based in Taiwan where the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek had fled following their defeat 
in the civil war against the Communists. By 1971, however, the People’s Republic of China had gained 
enough international support for the UN General Assembly to pass a resolution declaring that it, and 
not the Republic of China, was the rightful representative of China. See, UN General Assembly 
Resolution 2758 (25 October 1971). 
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‘The principle of sovereignty not only means that the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of all countries are inviolable and their internal affairs are 
not subjected to interference. It also means that all countries’ right to 
independently choose social systems and development paths should be 
upheld, and that all countries’ endeavors to promote economic and social 
development and improve their people’s lives should be respected.47 
 
 As to the correlation between sovereignty and security threats, the following 
passage from the 1993 Chinese government white paper on the question of Taiwan is 
particularly instructive: 
‘In international affairs, the Chinese Government always pursues a foreign 
policy of peace and adheres to the Five Principles of [peaceful coexistence]. It 
actively seeks to develop friendly relations with all countries of the world and 
will never undermine any country's interests nor interfere in its internal 
affairs.  By the same token, it expects all other governments to refrain from 
undermining China's interests or interfering in China's internal affairs and to 
correctly handle their relations with Taiwan.’48  
 
 Of special relevance, here, is the U.S.’ relationship with Taiwan. This is so because, 
despite acknowledging the Chinese government’s position that ‘there is but one China 
and Taiwan is part of China’,49 the U.S. has officially committed to assist Taipei in 
maintaining its defensive capability. 50  Given China’s goal of promoting peaceful 
national reunification while opposing Taiwanese secessionist forces, Washington’s 
involvement is inevitably seen as an interference in China's internal affairs and is, 
therefore, viewed with deep suspicion by Beijing.  
 It is clear from the above that China has legitimate concerns about the potential 
weakening of sovereignty as a central principle of international relations. That said, 
while memories of the past and present-day self-preservation strategies may 
discourage Beijing from taking a more relaxed approach towards the principle, other 
factors steer it in a very different direction. The first thing to note in this respect is that 
                                                 
47 ‘Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-win Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared 
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UN General Assembly (28 September 2015) at  http://www.chinese-
embassy.org.uk/eng/zgyw/t1305051.htm [accessed 25 January 2018]. 
48 ‘The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China’, Taiwan Affairs Office & Information Office of the State 
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the expansion of China’s overseas interests has had a profound impact on the 
trajectory of its foreign policy. Following the programme of market reforms initiated 
in the late 1970s by Deng Xiaoping, China went, within just a few decades, from being 
politically isolated and economically weak to becoming an economic giant fully 
integrated in the international system. When the need to support this unprecedented 
economic growth began to require access to natural resources abroad, China’s global 
footprint inevitably, and considerably, expanded.51 Under the new circumstances, 
Beijing soon realized the importance of protecting its growing overseas interests (in 
the form of investments, assets and personnel), prompting a gradual, and yet 
significant, adjustment of its foreign policy thinking. In 2004, President Hu Jintao 
publicly referred to the necessity to enhance China’s capability to safeguard its 
interests abroad;52 a few years later the same concerns began to feature prominently 
in official State documents.53 Accordingly, the question of instability in countries of 
strategic importance to Beijing has been gradually integrated into Chinese foreign 
policy. Yet, how can China strive to promote structural stability abroad without 
interfering with the internal political and economic affairs of States? Evidently, the 
need to protect its global interests has made a rigid interpretation of the five principles 
of peaceful coexistence increasingly untenable, drawing China into a sort of ‘non-
intervention’ dilemma. 54  Against this background, it is not surprising that some 
Chinese scholars have begun suggesting that pragmatic concepts such as ‘creative 
                                                 
51
 For a broader discussion of China’ economic transformation, see, E. Economy and M. Levi, By All 
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54 Z. Pang, China’s Non-Intervention Question, (2009) 1 Global Responsibility to Protect, pp. 237-252, at 
p. 246. 
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involvement,’ 55  ‘soft intervention’, 56  ‘harmonious intervention, 57  or ‘conditional 
interference’,58 should now shape China’s foreign policy decision making.59 
 The move away from a strict non-intervention policy is simultaneously driven by 
another factor, namely China’s ambition to act as a responsible global power. 
Economic growth has brought with it increasing demands that China become a 
responsible stakeholder. Although some in China have dismissed these calls as 
Western attempts to hinder the rise of the country, Chinese officials have ultimately 
embraced the idea that with more power comes more responsibility.60 At one level, 
China interprets this new role as an entitlement to be more vocal on the world stage, 
including, crucially, on questions of international law that directly affect its national 
interests. In an important sense, however, by accepting the costs and burden that come 
with being a responsible power Beijing is also seeking to refute the ‘China threat 
theory’, which, by portraying the country as a destabilizing force in global affairs, 
undermines both the present and future status of China in the world.61 Against this 
background, China’s contribution to collective efforts to, inter alia, improve global 
economic welfare, 62  combat climate change, 63  and strengthen non-proliferation 
regimes64 represent important signs of Beijing’s intention to engage responsibly with 
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Creative Involvement: The Evolution of China's Global Role (Routledge 2017).  
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global challenges. These actions certainly improve the international image of China, 
but so does taking concrete steps in particularly sensitive areas such as, for example, 
conflict prevention and resolution, that require a more direct involvement in States’ 
domestic affairs. In this sense, Beijing’s expanding engagement with UN 
peacekeeping operations, which will be further discussed in section 6 below, has also 
brought reputational benefits to China, enhancing its moral standing both in the eyes 
of its own citizens and those of other countries.65   
 It is, therefore, clear that China is caught between the desire, or, at least, temptation, 
to soften its approach to ‘non-intervention’ and the awareness that doing so in an 
unconstrained manner could contribute, against its own interests, to mount a serious 
challenge to the essence of sovereignty. In many important respects, Beijing’s 
inauguration of a new era of foreign policy based on the concept of ‘major country 
diplomacy with Chinese characteristics’ seeks to strike a balance between these two 
competing impulses. 66  Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China has explicitly 
acknowledged the need to adjust its foreign policy in line with its new status as a 
global power. 67  In a marked departure from Deng Xiaoping’s cardinal rule of 
‘keeping a low profile and biding your time’, this means that, as China’s global 
influence and interests grow, its diplomacy must become more ‘enterprising and 
innovative.’68 Among other things, this new proactive approach presupposes that 
                                                 
of the Press Secretary, July 21, 2015, at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
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Beijing should become more directly involved in addressing complex international 
situations and strive to provide a Chinese perspective to their solution.69  
 The advancement of this new form of diplomacy, however, should not be read as a 
validation of interventionist policies and/or a challenge to other States’ sovereignty. 
Indeed, Chinese authorities have been careful to emphasize that Beijing’s new foreign 
policy will continue to be guided by the five principles of peaceful coexistence,70 and 
that mutual respect based on the sovereign equality of States, peace, development, 
and win-win cooperation (as opposed to confrontation) constitute the pillars on which 
the model of international relations envisioned by China is built. Indeed, a clear 
indication that Beijing has no intention to repudiate its traditional anti-interventionist 
stance can be found in Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s articulation of the three principles 
that China is called to respect while ‘handling hotspot issues’, namely refraining from 
intervening in the internal affairs of States, avoiding the pursuit of selfish interests, 
and promoting political, rather than military, solutions. 71 
 Having outlined the dynamics of China’s present-day struggle to define a 
straightforward approach to questions of sovereignty and non-intervention, the article 
will now proceed to evaluate how the competing forces that were discussed above 
play out in the specific context of Beijing’s engagement with R2P.  
 
 
4. R2P in International Law 
It is widely accepted, today, that the international community should contribute 
to prevent, and if prevention fails, respond to atrocity crimes. What is less clear is 
under what circumstances, and how, it should do so. Amidst these uncertainties, R2P 
has gained international recognition as a guiding principle for collective action against 
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genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, quickly 
evolving from representing an emerging idea in the late 1990s to being openly 
accepted into the international legal space and formally embedded in the UN 
institutional architecture only a few years later.72 In this sense, it represents a useful 
lens through which to analyze contemporary perspectives on how to protect 
endangered populations. 
In many respects, it was the events in Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Kosovo that 
accelerated the emergence of R2P. On the one hand, the failure of the international 
community to protect the victims of the genocide that took place in Rwanda  and 
Srebrenica made it abundantly clear that international mechanisms needed to be 
created in order to deal promptly and efficiently with conscience-shocking events of 
that kind. 73  On the other hand, the decision of NATO to intervene militarily in 
Kosovo to put an end to the ethnic cleansing campaign initiated by Slobodan 
Milosevic was widely criticized both outside NATO and among international lawyers. 
While, politically, many questioned the narrative of this ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
as necessary and beneficial, it was the dubious legal basis of the operation that 
ultimately undermined its credibility.74 At that time, despite recognizing that the 
situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and security in the region, and even 
referring to an impending humanitarian catastrophe that needed to be prevented, the 
UN Security Council fell short of authorizing military action against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. 75  This omission is of enormous significance in terms of 
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international law. According to the UN Charter, member States are allowed to use 
force in the conduct of their international relations only in self-defense (Article 51) or 
as authorized by the Security Council (acting under its Chapter VII powers). Outside 
these two categories of exception, States are under a general obligation, reflected in 
Article 2(4), to refrain from using force.  
In light of the above, it is not surprising that a significant number of States disputed 
the legality of the NATO campaign.76 In response, it was suggested that, while illegal, 
the intervention was nevertheless legitimate because all diplomatic avenues had been 
exhausted and no other way of stopping the ongoing atrocities was realistically 
conceivable.77 Although admirable in its intent, this attempt to reconcile legality and 
morality fully exposed the inherent political and legal difficulties surrounding the 
notion of humanitarian intervention, catalyzing the conceptual shift towards a, 
politically, less contested and, legally, more acceptable solution to the problem of 
heinous crimes.78 
This shift materialized in the form of R2P. In September 2000, the government of 
Canada and a group of major foundations set up the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) with the task of reflecting on the legal, 
moral, operational and political questions surrounding the issue of intervention for 
humanitarian purposes. The ensuing report, completed in 2001, successfully reframed 
the intervention discourse by shifting the terms of the debate from an individual right 
to intervene to a collective responsibility to protect. 79  In doing so, however, it 
envisioned a variant of R2P which many States considered too ambitious, especially 
if juxtaposed with the existing rules of international law on the use of force.80  A few 
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years later, this general dissatisfaction led to a substantial redefinition of R2P as 
reflected in the World Summit Outcome unanimously adopted by the General 
Assembly in resolution 60/1 of 2005. 
 The World Summit Outcome diluted the ICISS-inspired model of R2P in four main 
ways. First, by restricting the scope of R2P interventions to genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity; second, by requiring that States 
‘manifestly fail’ to protect their populations before any R2P action may be 
contemplated; third, by re-affirming that the use of force is the monopoly of the 
Security Council; and, finally, by subscribing to a qualified political commitment by 
the international community to protect endangered people rather than accepting a 
legal responsibility to do so. For the purpose of this article, it is particularly important 
to highlight that, by referring to States’ commitment ‘to take timely and decisive action 
on a case-by-case basis’ and eschewing the formulation of a set of criteria informing 
the relevant decision-making process, the World Summit Outcome granted the 
Security Council, and, in turn, the P5, a large room for maneuver in implementing the 
principle. 
The essence of this (cautious) version of R2P was later captured in the ‘three pillar 
structure’ put forward by the UN General Secretary Ban Ki Moon.81 According to this 
model, the first pillar of R2P refers to the responsibility of individual States to protect 
their populations from atrocity crimes; the second affirms the responsibility of the 
international community, through the UN, to use all appropriate peaceful means to 
‘assist’ States in effectively discharging the above duty; and the third relates to the 
responsibility of the international community to take, on a case-by-case basis, timely 
and decisive action if a State is manifestly failing to protect its population. It is through 
the lens of this prudent, and internationally validated variant of R2P that the 
                                                 
pp. 143-169; M. Pollentine, Constructing the Responsibility to Protect (PhD Thesis, Cardiff University 2012). 
See also, Final Document of the 14th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-
Aligned Movement (Havana, September 2006), at 
http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/14NAMSummit-Havana-Compiled.pdf 
[accessed 25 January 2018]; and Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty, International Development Research Centre, 2001. 
81 ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/63/677 
(12 January 2009). 
18 
 
remaining part of the article will examine China’s conceptual and practical 
engagement with the various dimensions of the principle. 
 
 
5. China and R2P’s Three Pillar-Structure: Conceptual Engagement 
In an important sense, R2P presupposes a novel understanding of State 
sovereignty.82 States are still entitled to exercise exclusive jurisdiction within their 
own territory as well as to conduct their affairs without outside interference; yet, 
crucially, these prerogatives are no longer absolute but, instead, become contingent 
on a State’ willingness and ability to protect its population from mass atrocities. In 
other words, should a State fail to live up to its responsibility to protect its own people, 
that responsibility is transferred to the international community. The first dimension 
of this new vision of sovereignty, namely that States have a duty to protect their 
populations, is not particularly controversial if one considers the evolution of 
international law in the last few decades, especially in the fields of international 
criminal law and international human rights law. On the contrary, the proposition that 
States' entitlement to immunity from external interferences wanes as they fail to 
protect their own people is inevitably more problematic in that it opens up a 
potentially major space for external intervention, including, crucially, military 
intervention. As will be shown below, China has no objection to the notion of 
sovereignty as responsibility but has important concerns about the modalities, and 
consequences, of the activation of the ‘fallback responsibility’ on the part of the 
international community. 
As discussed already, China does not subscribe to an absolute version of 
sovereignty which, among other things, would give States the unlimited power to do 
what they want to their own people. Instead, it takes the view that sovereignty carries 
with it the obligation for States to, generally, fulfill their international law obligations 
and, specifically, protect the security and welfare of their populations.83 Consistent 
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with this, Beijing has unambiguously endorsed the first pillar’s proposition that 
national governments have the primary responsibility to protect their populations.84 
 More importantly, China has also accepted that the international community has a 
collective responsibility to help to protect populations from atrocity crimes. 85 From a 
sovereignty standpoint, this implies a recognition of the legitimacy of the international 
community’s involvement in (certain) internal affairs of States. The extent of the 
involvement, however, varies substantially between pillar 2 and 3 scenarios. 
International action under the second pillar focuses on prevention and consists mainly 
of encouraging and assisting States to meet their duty to protect. It includes a wide 
range of economic, political, humanitarian and even military tools such as the 
deployment of armed units for non-coercive purposes.86 Considering the above as well 
as the fact that pillar 2 situations would normally involve governments which are not 
the direct perpetrators of violent crimes, but, rather, find themselves under stress 
before an imminent or ongoing crisis,87 a mutual and active partnership between the 
international community and the State concerned is necessary for the successful 
exercise of this form of collective responsibility.88 In other words, pillar 2 action can 
hardly occur against the will of the State concerned. This is crucial in understanding 
China’s prompt endorsement of this pillar. Indeed, Beijing has often 
(over)emphasized this important aspect by noting that ‘the implementation of “R2P” 
should not contravene the principle of state sovereignty and the principle of non-
interference of internal affairs’.89 
Not surprisingly, statements of this kind have raised concerns about China’s 
genuine commitment to R2P. This is especially true if one were to interpret them as 
applying to the whole range of options available under the R2P banner. As will be also 
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discussed in the next section, however, China’s archetypal pledge to uphold R2P in 
conjunction with the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention is essentially 
confined to pillar 2 situations. As such, it serves as a reminder that, in those 
circumstances, international action can only take place with the consent of the affected 
government. Understood in these terms, Beijing’s preoccupation with protecting State 
sovereignty is not necessarily out of tune with the spirit of R2P. Indeed, it should not 
be forgotten that in international law the consent of the government concerned is 
normally a legal requirement for a variety of UN-sponsored measures which interfere 
in the internal affairs of States such as, for example, the establishment of early warning 
systems or the sending of fact-finding missions.90 It is also particularly telling that 
State consent is a legal prerequisite even for the deployment of traditional UN 
peacekeeping operations.91 Thus, by accentuating the importance of ‘consent’ in pillar 
2 situations, China is not seeking to undermine R2P but, rather, prevent that issues of 
human rights and humanitarian assistance could be used as pretexts to unduly violate 
States’ sovereignty.92  
China’s concerns about potential infringements of sovereignty become 
considerably more intense with regard to the principle’s third pillar. In pillar 3 
scenarios, which usually involve a national government committing atrocity crimes, 
the limited international involvement characteristic of pillar 2 would normally give 
way to more robust and intrusive forms of intervention. Evidently, the coercive nature 
of the latter represents a direct threat to the principle of sovereignty. On top of that, 
while not all the coercive measures associated with pillar 3 involve the use of force (as 
the case of economic sanctions clearly demonstrates), 93  the range of actions 
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contemplated under this pillar does certainly include military operations. Indeed, as 
frequently observed by its own advocates, to be truly meaningful R2P must 
necessarily comprise a military option.94 In light of all that, R2P’s third pillar presents 
three main challenges for China. First, Beijing’s preference is to deal with conflict 
situations through diplomatic and political channels. In this sense, it is considerably 
less prone to support coercive measures than it is to endorse consensual ones. 95 
Second, China has a principled objection to resorting to force for humanitarian 
purposes.96 Its position on humanitarian intervention was clearly articulated at the 
time of the NATO operations in Kosovo that were discussed earlier. According to 
China, the latter represented a serious violation of the UN Charter that both 
undermined the authority of the Security Council and set an extremely dangerous 
precedent in the history of international relations. 97  Third, China is seriously 
concerned about the possibility of strong forms of intervention being used as a 
(Western) instrument for regime change and democracy promotion.98 
Because of all these reasons, China has not been willing to openly endorse the core 
tenets of R2P’s third pillar. That said, Beijing has not rejected them either. International 
law helps to shed light on the reasons behind this ambivalent position. As discussed 
in section 4, R2P coercive action, including military interventions, must necessarily be 
authorized by the Security Council. In this sense, R2P has not brought any significant 
alteration of the international legal landscape. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
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the Security Council is empowered to take peaceful or non-peaceful measures in 
response to a threat to international peace and security. Thanks to an expansive 
interpretation of the concept of ‘threat to the peace’, the Council has long been able to 
authorize enforcement measures in the context of civil wars and/or humanitarian 
crises.99 Crucially, measures taken under Chapter VII are not limited by the principle 
of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States. As specified by Article 2(7) of the 
UN Charter: 
‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state … but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII.’ 
  
 All this means that, irrespective of R2P, the Security Council is not only entitled to 
take coercive action in dealing with humanitarian crises, but can also do so without 
the need to obtain the consent of the target State. It goes without saying that, as a 
permanent member yielding veto power, China has an interest in preserving the 
Council’s prerogatives. This explains why, despite favoring a restrained approach to 
the third pillar, Beijing does not, and indeed, as a matter of international law, cannot 
object to it. The resulting ambivalence is well reflected in the Chinese habit of 
acknowledging the capacity of the Security Council to authorize coercive action in R2P 
situations without expressly saying so. A good example is provided by China’ official 
statement at the 2009 General Assembly debate on R2P: 
‘the responsibility of the [Security] Council entrusted by the UN Charter is the maintenance 
of international peace and security. The prerequisite for its taking action is the existence of 
“any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”. The Council must 
consider “R2P” in the broader context of maintaining international peace and security, and 
must guard against abusing the concept.’100 
 
  Further evidence of China’s implicit endorsement of the whole range of options 
available under R2P is provided by its typical demand that, as far as possible, 
humanitarian crises should be solved by peaceful means.101 Indeed, China is among 
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the countries that sought to promote a strict sequential approach to R2P’s three pillar-
model based on the assumption that no military action under pillar 3 can occur until 
all available options under pillar 2 have failed.102 
 In conclusion, given its inclination to rely on consensual and peaceful means of 
solving international crises, which, in turn, stems from its defensive stance on 
sovereignty, Beijing is significantly less comfortable with the third pillar of R2P than 
it is with its second. At the same time, China quietly accepts that, under exceptional 
circumstances, coercive measures, including military force, could be employed to 
respond to mass atrocity situations. These measures, however, must necessarily be 
authorized by the Security Council, in accordance with both the UN Charter and the 
model of R2P endorsed by the General Assembly in 2005. 
 
 
6. China and R2P’s Three Pillar-Structure: Practical Engagement 
 China has supported several Security Council resolutions which expressly re-
affirmed the R2P language of the 2005 World Summit Outcome.103 This is important 
because, in doing so, Beijing has not only reiterated its endorsement of the principle, 
but also contributed to further embed it in the fabric of international law. Consistent 
with this, China has also regularly voted in favor of resolutions which either reminded 
States of their responsibility to protect their populations (pillar 1),104 or were aimed 
at providing international assistance to national governments facing an imminent or 
ongoing crisis (pillar 2).105 It should also be mentioned that, after decades of wariness, 
Beijing has become an active supporter of peacekeeping operations, which represent 
one important instrument through which the UN can implement R2P’s second pillar. 
Remarkably, China is today the second largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping 
budget, 106  and the largest supplier, among the P5, of military and civilian 
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personnel.107 It is also telling that China has not only backed traditional peacekeeping 
operations but has also authorized and participated in more ‘robust’ missions, which 
typically combine the capacity to use force beyond self-defense with the ability to 
temporarily displace certain functions of State authority.108 Beijing, however, has not 
done so unreservedly. On the contrary, it has expressed discomfort at the prospect of 
peace operations becoming increasingly intrusive, re-affirming, instead, the centrality 
of the classic principles of peacekeeping, namely consent of the parties, impartiality, 
and non-use of force except in self-defense and in defense of the mandate. 109  
 Occasionally China has also taken concrete steps to facilitate the provision of pillar 
2 assistance on the part of the international community. For example, following the 
violent government crackdown on peaceful protesters in September 2007, it was 
instrumental in persuading Myanmar authorities to meet with UN officials in order 
to work towards a resolution of the crisis.110 Similarly, in June 2007 it played a vital 
role in facilitating the deployment of a hybrid United Nations-African Union 
peacekeeping operation in the violence-wracked Darfur region in western Sudan.111 
Since both the governments of Myanmar and Sudan ultimately consented to these 
forms of ‘external’ involvement, the conduct of China did not formally infringe the 
much revered principle of non-intervention. In practice, however, these instances of 
induced consent indicate that Beijing is prepared to take a more flexible approach to 
sovereignty than its rhetoric often suggests. Indeed, in light of the shift in its foreign 
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policy discourse discussed in section 3 above, China’s use of its political and economic 
leverage as a means to promote the resolution of conflict situations may be expected 
to intensify in the future. This seems to be confirmed by Beijing’s recent involvement 
in the Rohingya crisis. In September 2017, following a brutal security operation in 
Myanmar's northwestern Rakhine State, over 270,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh in 
less than three weeks. 112  With important geopolitical and economic interests at 
play,113 China intervened to broker talks between Myanmar and Bangladesh on the 
basis of a three-stage plan which included the restoration of order and stability in the 
Rakhine state, the opening of negotiations between the two governments on the safe 
return of the refugees, and the establishment of a poverty alleviation process.114 These 
diplomatic efforts are an important sign of Beijing’s increasing willingness to 
contribute responsibly to solve humanitarian crises. At the same time, the modalities 
of Beijing’s mediation revealed an inherent discomfort at the idea of intervening too 
heavily in the internal affairs of the States concerned, and especially of Myanmar with 
which China has close political and economic ties. In particular, given the gravity of 
the situation,115 the failure to raise the question of accountability and the fact that no 
calls were made for direct UN involvement in the relevant political process raised 
important concerns about China’s interpretation of the spirit of R2P’s second pillar.116  
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 Finally, the Chinese response to the humanitarian crises in Libya and Syria can help 
to shed light on the nature and dynamics of China’s engagement with R2P’s third, and 
most challenging, dimension. In February 2011, Libyan governmental forces deployed 
lethal force to repress a popular uprising which began in Benghazi and quickly spread 
to other cities. Among others, the UN Human Rights Council promptly condemned 
the gross and systematic human rights violations committed by national security 
officials, which included indiscriminate armed attacks against civilians, extrajudicial 
killings, arbitrary arrests, as well as the detention and torture of peaceful 
demonstrators.117 Noting that some of these atrocities could amount to crimes against 
humanity, the Human Rights Council also called upon the Libyan Government to 
meet its responsibility to protect its population. On its part, the UN Security Council 
quickly adopted Resolution 1970 imposing an arms embargo, applying sanctions and 
travel bans on governmental figures, and referring the situation to the International 
Criminal Court.118 As they entailed (non-forcible) coercion, these measures fell within 
the scope of R2P’s third pillar. It is, therefore, significant that China supported them 
by voting in favor of the resolution. As this did not stop Gaddafi from continuing to 
violently suppress the popular revolt, and amidst concerns about an imminent assault 
on the city of Benghazi, on 17th March 2011 the Security Council passed another 
resolution, namely Resolution 1973, which, after reiterating the responsibility of the 
Libyan government to protect their population, imposed a no-fly zone and authorized 
the use of ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians and civilian populated areas. 
The uniqueness of this resolution lies in the fact that, for the first time, the Security 
Council explicitly authorized the use of force for the protection of civilians against (the 
will of) a functioning State. It is in fact for this reason that the adoption of Resolution 
1973 was hailed as a major triumph for R2P.119  
 China allowed this resolution to pass by abstaining on the vote. According to 
several accounts, Beijing did so with a view to safeguarding its substantial 
investments in the country and protecting the safety of the over 36,000 Chinese 
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nationals who worked there.120 This abstention does not necessarily conflict with 
Beijing’s cautious approach to pillar 3, for, as suggested in section 4 above, China 
never rejected the possibility of resorting to force for humanitarian purposes provided 
that the relevant operations are authorized by the Security Council. Considering its 
characteristic aversion to the use force, however, this move surprised many observers, 
leading to speculations that China had softened its position on forcible intervention. 
In reality, in its explanation of the vote China emphasized the need to put an end to 
the violence against civilians, but also reiterated its opposition to the use of force in 
international relations, further expressing serious reservations about various elements 
of the adopted text.121 Importantly, it also specified that the (ad hoc) decision to cast a 
vote of abstention was made taking into consideration the special circumstances of the 
case, including, in particular, the presence of regional consensus on the need for 
external intervention. 122  In this respect, it should also be highlighted that the 
defection of several members of the Gaddafi government contributed to weaken the 
latter’s international standing, thus facilitating a more robust response by the 
international community.123 Crucially, Beijing’s doubts over the appropriateness of 
the resolution did not wane when NATO took control of the relevant operations. On 
the contrary, as NATO contravened the letter and spirit of Resolution 1973 by taking 
side with the rebels and pursuing regime change, both China and several other non-
Western States expressed serious concerns about how the UN mandate had been 
interpreted and executed. Indeed, as the modalities of NATO operations 
reinvigorated widespread fears that R2P could be abused to justify politically 
motivated interventions, Beijing officials began to have second thoughts over their 
decision to abstain rather than use the veto.124 
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 That China’s (indirect) support for coercive action in Libya did not necessarily 
reflect a shift in favor of R2P’s third pillar was further confirmed by Beijing's 
subsequent engagement in the Syrian crisis. The latter erupted in March 2011, when 
the government of President Assad began to use force to crush pro-democracy 
protesters demanding his resignation. While UN bodies were quick to denounce the 
grave and systematic human rights violations committed by Syrian authorities, 
including arbitrary executions, the killing and persecution of protesters, arbitrary 
detention, enforced disappearances, as well as torture and ill-treatment of 
detainees,125 the Security Council, paralyzed by the vetoes of Russia and China, failed 
to take any significant action to halt the violence. Beijing voted in favor of a number 
of resolutions aimed at easing the humanitarian situation, including one demanding 
the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons and one authorizing humanitarian 
agencies to access rebel-held areas without government consent, 126  while also 
abstaining on four resolutions, ultimately vetoed by Moscow, which would have 
condemned the bombardment of Aleppo, denounced the chemical attack that took 
place in Khan Shaykhun on 4th April 2017, and renewed the mandate of a UN mission 
investigating the use of chemical weapons.127 In a move that was criticized by many, 
however, China repeatedly sided with Russia in resisting the imposition of stronger 
measures against the Assad government, including economic sanctions and referral 
to the International Criminal Court. 
 Beijing’s heavy use of the veto in relation to the Syrian crisis raised the question of 
whether a new phase in the relationship between China and R2P had begun, namely 
one characterized by an outright rejection of the enforcing measures, be they forcible 
or non-forcible, typical of the third pillar. Certainly, the fact that Resolutions 1970 and 
1973 led to the overthrow of Gadhafi made Beijing even more mindful of the potential 
misuse of R2P rhetoric, strengthening its (pre-existing) inclination to favor assistance 
over intervention. During the Syrian crisis, this was clearly reflected in China’s firm 
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condemnation of regime change strategies,128 which can be seen as an attempt to 
recalibrate the relationship between sovereignty and intervention in the context of 
pillar 3 action.129 China’s staunch defense of Syrian sovereignty has also been linked 
to the fact that the Assad government remained largely intact.130 This, in turn, may 
have important implications in R2P terms as it may signal a broader commitment to 
protect effective governments from external intervention, thus setting a potentially 
very high threshold for robust action.131 
 All that said, Beijing’s position on the Syrian crisis should not be read as a sweeping 
rejection of the international community’s responsibility arising under R2P’s third 
pillar. Firstly, both the complexity and uniqueness of the situation should be 
highlighted. In China’s calculations, Assad may have offered the best chance of 
restoring stability and security in a country engulfed in a complex and brutal civil war, 
which, in light of its religious and geopolitical dimensions,132 risked instigating a 
wider wave of instability in a region of critical importance not only to Western States 
but also to Beijing’s resource-intense economy. Similarly, the effects of Moscow’s 
vigorous involvement in the conflict, both diplomatically and military, should not be 
overlooked. Without overstating the case for a solid political alliance between the two 
powers,133 China and Russia have often relied on each other’s support at the Security 
Council with a view to strengthening their respective positions within a body 
otherwise dominated by Western powers. This tactical alignment is made even more 
valuable by the fact that, driven by a broader convergence of interests, China and 
Russia often unite, both within and outside the UN, to advance common positions on 
various matters of international law and politics. Thus, just like Russia had previously 
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sided with China in preventing strong UN action against countries of strategic 
importance to Beijing, 134  China had an incentive to follow Moscow’s lead in 
defending Syria’s sovereignty.  
 Secondly, and more importantly, it is telling that, as China cast its initial vetoes, the 
official think-tank of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was intent on formulating a new 
Chinese approach to R2P, labelled ‘Responsible Protection’, 135  which, inter alia, 
accepted forcible intervention as an appropriate response to humanitarian crises 
provided that all diplomatic and political means are exhausted and that the goal of 
the intervention remains that of protecting innocent civilians rather than 
overthrowing a government.136 As such, and despite not being formally endorsed by 
the Chinese government, the concept of ‘Responsible Protection’ revealed China’s 
willingness to engage with, and shape the limits of R2P’s coercive pillar instead of 
simply objecting to it. It is also worth recalling that, although under different 
circumstances, China supported Security Council resolutions entailing forcible 
coercion for humanitarian purposes and/or imposing sanctions in the context of 
humanitarian crises both before and after Libya. For example, it voted in favour of 
Security Council Resolution 794 (1992), which, in an attempt to defuse the ‘human 
tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia’, authorized members States ‘to use all 
necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations’. 
It also abstained on Security Council Resolution 940 (1994) which authorized the use 
of force to restore peace and stability in Haiti following a coup d’état which had driven 
the democratically elected president into exile. Furthermore, it abstained on Security 
Council Resolution 1593 (2005) which referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC, and 
voted in favor of Security Council Resolution 1975 (2011) which imposed sanctions 
against the Former President of Cote d’Ivoire and urged him to step aside.137  
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 What the above analysis suggests, therefore, is that China has a clear predisposition 
towards political and peaceful solutions to conflict situations. That said, in light of the 
particular circumstances of the case, it may exceptionally support, or tolerate, coercive 
measures, especially if underpinned by regional consensus, which are not aimed at 
overthrowing an existing government. Unsurprisingly, in defining the relevant 
circumstances China will take into account not only humanitarian considerations but 
also the broader and complex realities of international politics, on the one hand, and 
its own security and development interests, on the other. While evidently not ideal 
and conducive to inconsistent outcomes, this logic is not only characteristic of great-
power behavior, 138  but also conforms to the notion of R2P that has come to be 
recognized in international law. Indeed, as highlighted in section 4 above, R2P 
responses to humanitarian crises are not structurally designed to achieve a high level 
of consistency.  
  
 
7. Conclusions 
 China’s sensitivity over sovereignty is often seen at odds with an international legal 
system that increasingly protects interests beyond those of the State. While China has 
always been a champion of sovereignty,139 its attitudes towards the principle are 
taking on a new significance in light of the country’s rise to great power status. Against 
this background, this article has examined Beijing’s conceptual and practical 
engagement with the principle of R2P, suggesting that its attempts to revisit its 
traditional foreign policy discourse in the context of humanitarian crises reveal that 
China does not always and necessarily subscribe to rigid interpretations of 
sovereignty.  
 China oscillates between the desire, or temptation, to soften its stance on non-
intervention and the preoccupation that doing so unreservedly could undermine, 
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against its own interests, the essence of sovereignty. The former impulse derives from 
Beijing’s necessity to protect its expanding overseas interests and ambition to enhance 
its status on the world stage; the latter is dictated by past experiences of 
encroachments on its own sovereignty and present-day concerns about protecting its 
internal structures and pattern of development. The interplay between these 
competing forces contributes to explain China’s complex and, at times, ambivalent 
approach to humanitarian crises. Contemporary institutional efforts to prevent and 
respond to atrocity crimes are guided by the principle of R2P, which is predicated on 
the assumption that States’ capacity to exercise their full sovereign powers is a 
function of their willingness and ability to protect their populations from mass 
atrocities. This means that when a State fails to live up to its responsibility to protect, 
the latter shifts to the international community. Considering that, once activated, 
international action can range from consensual assistance to forcible intervention, one 
may say, without exaggerating, that R2P strikes at the heart of sovereignty. In this 
sense, it inevitably conflicts with China’s understanding of the international system 
as a Westphalian, sovereignty-centred structure. At the same time, Beijing has 
important reasons to support R2P actions even if doing so might lead to infringements 
of sovereignty. First, as a rising global power its prosperity and security are 
increasingly dependent on peaceful development and stability across the globe. 
Second, in line with its aspiration to become a responsible power, taking action against 
atrocity crimes helps to promote the image of the country as a defender of basic values 
of humanity.  
 As a result of the interplay of the above factors, China has, first of all, endorsed the 
notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ which is reflected in R2P’s first pillar, 
accepting that sovereignty carries with it the responsibility for States to protect the 
welfare and security of their populations. More importantly, China has also 
recognized the legitimacy of the international community’s involvement in certain 
internal affairs of States as articulated by R2P’s second pillar. This has been greatly 
facilitated by the fact that, by virtue of its consensual nature, this form of international 
assistance appears compatible with a strict interpretation of sovereignty. That said, 
China’s practical engagement with R2P’s second pillar suggests that, under certain 
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circumstances, Beijing may be prepared to endorse more intrusive forms of 
intervention which tend to blur the distinction between consensual and non-
consensual forms of assistance. This tendency is best illustrated by China’s support 
for robust peace operations empowered to both use force beyond self-defense and 
displace certain functions of State authority, and use of its leverage to persuade 
national governments to agree to various forms of ‘external’ involvement. 
 As a State that favors political solutions to conflict situations and repudiates the use 
of force for humanitarian purposes, China finds it particularly difficult to engage with 
the third pillar of R2P. This is so because pillar 3 action is not only coercive in nature 
but may also include, as last resort, the use of force. This inevitably increases the risk 
of R2P being used to facilitate regime change, notably something that Beijing firmly 
condemns. For these reasons, China has not been willing to openly endorse this 
dimension of the principle. For political and legal reasons, however, it has not rejected 
it either. Politically, the fact that a mass atrocity situation could be perceived as posing 
a direct threat to China's security and/or development interests may exceptionally 
lead Beijing to soften its traditional aversion to coercive interventions. Legally, it 
should not be forgotten that the modalities of R2P forcible action have been designed 
so as to conform to the Charter of the United Nations. In particular, the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome has identified the Security Council as the only body capable of 
authorizing military operations under the R2P banner. In doing so, it has not conferred 
on the Council any new power because the latter has long been able, in accordance 
with Chapter VII of the Charter, to take enforcement measures, including the use force, 
in the context of civil wars and/or humanitarian crises. Evidently, as a permanent 
member yielding veto power, China has no incentive to either question or deny the 
existence of these well-established prerogatives. Indeed, Beijing’s conduct is in line 
with a quiet acceptance, and prudent interpretation, of the Security Council’s 
responsibility envisioned under pillar 3. Thus, while naturally predisposed towards 
political and peaceful solutions and very critical of regime change strategies, China 
has occasionally supported enforcement measures, including the use of force, in 
dealing with situations of crisis.  
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 All the above suggests that the relationship between China and R2P, and, in turn, 
sovereignty, is more complex and nuanced than one might assume. In addition, China 
may be prompted to make further adjustments to its approach to sovereignty and non-
intervention as the process of adaptation to its new role on the world stage continues 
to unfold. Indeed, in light of President Xi Jinping’s pursuit of a more proactive and 
enterprising role in global affairs, China’s involvement with humanitarian crises can 
be expected to intensify rather than diminish. Looking ahead, this is unlikely to result 
in a substantial hardening of China’s position towards pillar 3 action. An open 
endorsement of the latter remains in fact too problematic for a State which takes pride 
in presenting itself as a defender of sovereignty. Furthermore, given the widely shared 
view that armed interventions end up causing more harm than good, China does not 
face significant pressure to revisit its principled objection to the use of force for 
humanitarian ends. By contrast, and in line with the dictates of pillar 2, China can be 
expected to make more regular use of its political and economic leverage to support 
and facilitate prevention strategies, or, when atrocity crimes are occurring, create the 
conditions for (semi)consensual forms of intervention to take place. In this sense, the 
real challenge that Beijing will face going forward is not to show more willingness to 
engage in forcible interventions, but, rather, to make credible contributions to 
peacefully preventing or halting the commission of mass atrocities. As demonstrated 
by its recent involvement in the Rohingya crisis, this will not be an easy task to 
accomplish. Whether, and how, China succeeds in this endeavor, however, is of 
paramount importance because it will not only determine the nature and extent of its 
contribution to preventing and responding to atrocity crimes but also define, more 
broadly, its identity as a new global power.  
 
 
